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NOTE
Are You My Mother? Missouri Denies
Custodial Rights to Same-Sex Parent
White v. White, 293 S.W.3d I (Mo. App. W.D. 2009), transfer denied,
No. SC90330, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6, 2009).
EMMALEE M. MILLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Who should qualify as a parent? Courts have grappled with this ques-
tion for decades. To one court, "[t]he best person to bring up a child is the
natural parent. It matters not whether the parent is wise or foolish, rich or
poor, educated or illiterate . . . . Public authorities cannot improve on na-
ture."] Yet in a country where nearly four out of ten babies are born outside
2
of wedlock, approximately ten million children are raised by same-sex par-
ents,3 and about forty to forty-five percent of all marriages end in divorce,4
few children are born to two committed, biological parents who raise their
child together. Faced with this reality, some courts have allowed third parties
to establish custody and assert parental rights through alternative doctrines to
traditional parentage, such as de facto, in loco, and equitable parentage.
* B.A., Northwestern University, 2008; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2011; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2010-11. I
thank Professor Mary Beck for her encouragement to explore this topic, Professor
Philip Peters for his comments on an earlier draft, and the Missouri Law Review team
for their constant effort and edits. This Note is dedicated to my parents and brother
for their love, encouragement, and support. They are the "Hortons" in my life.
1. Lindsy J. Rohlf, The Psychological-Parent and De Facto-Parent Doctrines:
How Should the Uniform Parentage Act Define "Parent"?, 94 IOWA L. REV. 691, 693
(2009) (quoting In re K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access), [1988] A.C.
806, 812 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (opinion of Lord Templeman)).
2. The Associated Press, Nearly 4 in 10 U.S. Babies Born Out of Wedlock,
MSNBC, Nov. 21, 2006, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1 5835429/.
3. Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adju-
dicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 342
(2002); Valerie Kellogg, How the Children of the Gay Baby Boom Are Faring,
NEWSDAY, July 10, 2001, at B10.
4. David Crary, U.S. Divorce Rate at Lowest Level Since '70, CHI. TRIBUNE,
May 11, 2007, at C5.
5. See infra Part IIl.C.
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However, these alternative doctrines remain controversial and not all states
have adopted or applied them in the same way.
Recently, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District held that a
nonbiological parent lacked rights to the child of her former lesbian partner in
White v. White.7  The same-sex parents planned the pregnancy together,
shared the costs, and jointly raised the child.8 Yet, without a biological con-
tribution or a marriage license recognized by the state, the court refused to
grant the plaintiff parental rights.9
This Note argues that Missouri should adopt a doctrine of alternative pa-
rentage that expands the definition of "parent" to include those in same-sex
relationships who are not the biological or adoptive parents.' 0 In Part II, this
Note analyzes the facts and holding of White. Next, in Part 111, this Note
explores the Uniform Parentage Act and introduces the nontraditional forms
of standing created by courts to allow third parties to obtain custody rights.
Then, Part IV examines the court's rationale in White. Lastly, Part V ex-
plores why the court erred in its decision and why courts should recognize
alternative forms of parentage. This Note concludes that by refusing to rec-
ognize the rights of same-sex parents, Missouri courts not only discriminate
against gay parents, but they also discriminate against their children by refus-
ing to recognize their rights to two legal parents.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1997, Leslea White and Elizabeth Michelle Crowe (Michelle) entered
into a committed, intimate, same-sex relationship that exhibited many of the
same characteristics as that of a heterosexual couple." From the beginning of
the relationship, the couple discussed having children and agreed to raise
them together.12 Leslea claimed that before the birth of their children, she
6. See infra Part Ill.C.
7. 293 S.W.3d 1, 25 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009), transfer denied, No. SC90330,
2009 Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6, 2009).
8. See id. at 6.
9. Id. at 25.
10. Missouri currently defines "parent" as:
[A] biological or adoptive parent, including a presumed or putative father.
The word parent shall also include any person who has been found to be
such by: (a) A court of competent jurisdiction in an action for dissolution
of marriage, legal separation, or establishment of the parent and child rela-
tionship; (b) The division under section 454.485; (c) Operation of law un-
der section 210.823, RSMo; or (d) A court or administrative tribunal of
another state.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 454.440(6) (2000).
11. White, 293 SW.3d at 6.
12. Appellants' Brief at *5, White v. White, 293 S.W.3d I (Mo. App. W.D.
2009) (No. WD 69580), 2008 WL 4143932.
1378 [Vol. 75
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and Michelle agreed that together they would raise and support any children
born during their relationship. 13 Leslea alleged that this understanding con-
tinued throughout the relationship. 14
Subsequently, both women conceived a child by artificial insemination
through the donation of the same anonymous sperm donor.15 According to
Leslea, the couple chose to conceive in this manner in order to create a bio-
logical bond between themselves and their children, in addition to the psycho-
logical bond that they hoped would develop by raising the children together.
In this way, Michelle gave birth to C.E.W. on December 15, 2001, and Leslea
gave birth to Z.A.W. on July 27, 2004.17 The women shared the costs of the
inseminations, pregnancies, and births.'8 Leslea also asserted that they at-
tended the pregnancy-related medical appointments together and supported
each other during the births, including cutting each other's umbilical cord.'9
Additionally, on September 12, 2002, after the birth of the couple's first
child, Leslea claimed that Michelle legally changed her last name from
Crowe to White so that all of the members of the family would share the
same last name.20
The women's relationship lasted eight years.21 During that time, they
moved in together and raised the children as siblings.22 The children called
Leslea "Mommy" and Michelle "Mama.23 After the women separated in
November 2005, they voluntarily shared custody of the children.24 However,
in late May 2006, Michelle unilaterally terminated this arrangement against
Leslea's wishes.25 She refused to allow C.E.W. to have any contact with
26Z.A.W. or Leslea. She would not accept money for C.E.W. from Leslea,
stopped having any contact with Z.A.W., and refused to contribute financially
to Z.A.W.'s welfare.27
As a result, on January 18, 2007, Leslea filed a petition for declaration
of maternity, order of custody, and order of child support on her own behalf
and as next friend for minors C.E.W. and Z.A.W. in the Circuit Court of
13. White, 293 S.W.3d at 23.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at *7.
17. White, 293 S.W.3d at 6.
18. Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at *5-6.
19. Id. at *5-7.
20. Id. at *6.
21. Id. at *2, *5.
22. Id.
23. Id at *6.
24. Id. at *7; see also White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009),
transfer denied, No. SC90330, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6, 2009).
25. White, 293 S.W.3d at 6; see also Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at *7.
26. White, 293 S.W.3d at 6; see also Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at *7.
27. White, 293 S.W.3d at 6.
2010] 1379
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Boone County, Missouri.28 Leslea claimed that the children were deprived of
the care of two parents and the companionship of one another.29 Her petition
also stated that neither child has a natural or presumed father.30 As a result,
she asked the court to find both women the legal parents of the children and
award joint legal and physical custody. 3 1 Additionally, she asked the court to
order both women to pay child support. In the alternative, if the court ruled
against joint legal and physical custody, Leslea asked for primary physical
custody of the children and visitation rights for Michelle.33
In response, Michelle filed a motion to dismiss Leslea's petition for both
lack of standing and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.34 In her motion, Michelle claimed that Leslea had no standing under
the Missouri Uniform Parentage Act (the MoUPA) because C.E.W. is not
Leslea's biological child.35 She further argued that no statute enables a non-
biologically related female to claim maternity rights to a child. 36 Additional-
ly, Michelle claimed that since the MoUPA, as the "exclusive means" of es-
tablishing parentage in Missouri, does not acknowledge the creation of a de
facto, equitable, or psychological parent-child relationship, the terms are in-
applicable. 37 In response, Leslea argued that as an "'interested party,"' she
had standing under the MoUPA, which would allow the court to exercise
parens patriae authority by finding Michelle and Leslea to be defacto parents
to Z.A.W. and C.E.W.38 In the alternative, Leslea claimed that she could also
have standing as a third party through the common law "exceptional circums-
tances" doctrine.39
28. Id.
29. Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at *2.
30. White, 293 S.W.3d at 6.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 6 n.2. Leslea claimed that she was not trying to terminate Michelle's
physical custody of C.E.W. Id. Rather, she claimed she wanted to share custody of
the child. Id.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Id. at 6-7.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id.
39. Id. The exceptional circumstances doctrine applies when "'exceptional cir-
cumstances' may warrant a grant of custody or visitation to a third party even where
the biological parent is not unfit." Id. at 17. Additionally,
the presumption which favors vesting of custody in the natural parent
must fall whenever the best interests of the child, for some special or ex-
traordinary reason or circumstance, mandate that custody be vested in
third persons, regardless of whether the evidence establishes the unfitness
or incompetence of the natural parent.
Id. at 18 (quoting In re K.K.M., 647 S.W.2d 866, 890 (Mo. App. E.D. 1983)).
[Vol. 751380
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After Leslea filed her petition, a family court commissioner of the Cir-
cuit Court of Boone County appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the
children. 40 After holding several hearings, the family court commissioner
41denied Michelle's motion to dismiss. Michelle was granted a rehearing
before a family court judge, who dismissed Leslea's petition without preju-
dice and without indicating a reason for the ruling.42
Leslea conjectured that the court dismissed her claim for lack of stand-
ing and failure to state a claim. 43 She filed ten points on appeal with the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals, Western District." Applying de novo review, the
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion and dismissed Leslea's petition, reasoning that (1) Leslea lacked stand-
40. Id. at 7.
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at *9, *12-13.
44. White, 293 S.W.3d at 7. See generally Appellants' Brief, supra note 12.
Two amicus curiae briefs were filed with the court in support of Leslea and the child-
ren's claims. White, 293 S.W.3d at 7 n.4. The first was filed by the National Asso-
ciation of Social Workers and the National Association of Social Workers, Missouri
Chapter, and the second was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern
Missouri, the American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas and Western Missouri, and
the American Civil Liberties Union Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender & Aids
Project. Id. Ten points were listed in the appellate brief: (1) Leslea and both children
have standing under MoUPA sections 210.826.2 and 210.848; (2) the circuit court
erred by failing to "exercise its parens patriae responsibility to apply common law
and equitable principles to safeguard the best interests of children raised in diverse
family structures"; (3) "the circuit court erred in dismissing the petition because Les-
lea is the defacto parent of C.E.W. and Michelle is the defacto parent of Z.A.W. in
that the women consented to and fostered reciprocal parent-child relationships with
the children"; (4) "Leslea stands in loco parentis to C.E.W. and Michelle stands in
loco parentis to Z.A.W. in that the women held themselves and each other out to the
world as the parents of both children"; (5) "[Michelle] is equitably estopped from
denying that the parent-child and sibling relationships in this family are entitled to
legal protection in that appellee encouraged and fostered the family relationships on
which appellants relied"; (6) "[Leslea] has standing and states a claim for third party
custody and visitation under the exceptional circumstances doctrine"; (7) "[Leslea and
the children] have standing and state claims for relief in that the interests of children
conceived through anonymous donor insemination in maintaining an ongoing rela-
tionship with and support from their second intended parent are entitled to protection
from the courts"; (8) the court deprived Leslea and the children of their rights to due
process; (9) dismissal "deprived [Leslea and the children] of their rights to equal
protection . . . in that [they] were deprived on the basis of legitimacy, sexual orienta-
tion, and sex of family protections and support available to other Missouri families";
and (10) "dismissal of the petition unconstitutionally deprived appellants of their
rights under Missouri's open courts guarantee . . . in that appellants were denied the
opportunity to petition the court to enforce legal protections for their parent-child
relationships." Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at *15-66.
2010] 1381
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ing under the MoUPA, the alternative parent doctrines, and equitable estop-
pel; (2) her claim did not fall under the exceptional circumstances doctrine or
a contractual assumption made by the parties; and (3) she had no constitu-
tionally valid claims under due process, equal protection, or the open courts
guarantee.45
1II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Traditionally, courts afforded only biological parents legal rights to cus-
tody of a child.46 However, as the number of traditional families dwindles,
states and governmental entities create flexible laws and theories to adapt to
these changes.47 The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) promulgated the theory
that parental rights should arise from the relationship between the parent and
48
child, rather than the relationship between the parents. Although Missouri
adopted a majority of the UPA, the state's courts do not consider the UPA the
"exclusive method for determining paternity" ;49 even so, they have yet to
adopt other nontraditional theories to resolve cases where two same-sex indi-
viduals assert parentage.50
A. Beginning with Biology
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution protects a biological parent's right to custody of
his or her children.5' In fact, a parent's custody right is "perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme Court]." 52
However, as a result of the increased rate of divorce, the disintegration
of the nuclear family, and the increase in same-sex parentage, children today
are less likely to live with two biological parents.53 Thus, the scope of protec-
tion that the Supreme Court grants to custodial rights has become increasing-
ly important. According to some, Supreme Court precedent suggests that a
parent's right to custody is determined more by the parent's relationship with
45. White, 293 S.W.3d. 1.
46. See infra Part IlIl.A.
47. Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right
to Child Custody is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REv. 705, 706-25 (1986).
48. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(14) (amended 2002).
49. White, 293 S.W.3d at 10, 12 (citing In re Marriage of Fry, 108 S.W.3d 132,
136 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003)).
50. See infra Part Ill.C.
51. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Haynie, supra note 47,
at 726.
52. In re N.N.E., 752 N.W.2d 1, 8-9 (Iowa 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting
Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 2001)).
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the child than by the parent's biological tie to the child.54 Yet, the Supreme
Court has never identified the custody rights of a third-party parent in a same-
sex relationship.
Even if third parties continue to gain more custodial rights and courts
focus on child-parent relationships, "the genetic bond of parenthood contin-
ues to remain a central theme for redefining family relationships." State
and federal courts have frequently placed children with their formerly absent
biological fathers and mothers over third parties who cared for the children
and developed deep relationships with them.57 Courts have also maintained
that a child can only have two legal parents, regardless of whether more than
two individuals are able to assert standing as parents.58 Overall, third-party
custody rights remain a highly contested issue in both state and federal courts.
54. See id at 736; see also, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
(noting the importance of the father's cohabitation with the mother and his desire to
raise the child as his own); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (noting putative
father had never established relationship with his child).
55. Haynie, supra note 47, at 728.
56. Philip F. Schuster II, Constitutional and Family Law Implications of the
Sleeper and Troxel Cases: A Denouement for Oregon's Psychological Parent Sta-
tute?, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 549, 569 (2000).
57. See, e.g., In re Doe, No. T11CPO3011510A, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 634
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2006) (court refused to terminate the mother's rights, even
though her seven-year-old son had "been cared for by his [foster parent] for more than
thirty months and ha[d] grown accustomed to a stable home and family"); Hutchinson
v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) (trial court awarded custody of all three
children to the father because the mother was a heavy drinker and had neglected them
in the past, but the state supreme court reversed the decision and remanded the case to
determine the custody rights of the eldest child because, although the father might
have been a more fit parent, he was not biologically related).
58. Deborah H. Wald, Esq., The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Ge-
netics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 379, 381, 406 (2007) (citing Georgina G. v. Terry
M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 684-85 (Wis. 1994) (court denied a lesbian the right to adopt
her partner's biological child because even though the court found the adoption was in
the best interests of the child, the rights of both biological parents had not been termi-
nated, the child's best interests in an adoption is not a protected liberty, and the child
could still have a relationship with her mother's partner).
13832010]
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B. The Uniform Parentage Act
The Uniform Parentage Act was first introduced in 1973 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 59 Since then, almost
half of the states have adopted the UPA in full, and many more states have
drafted laws congruous with the Act.60
The UPA stresses the importance of the relationship between the child
and the parent, rather than the relationship between the parents.61 For exam-
ple, a 2000 revision to the Act defined a parent-child relationship as "the legal
relationship between a child and a parent of the child."62 Since a "legal rela-
tionship" can be established in ways other than biology,63 "the Act broadens
the scope of whose parental status can reasonably be adjudicated."6 In this
way, the Act stresses the rights of all caregivers, regardless of biological ties,
to be deemed parents under the law. The revision also permits men to estab-
lish paternity rights through nontraditional mechanisms such as putative fa-
ther registries.65
The UPA was further amended in 2002 to recognize lesbian women who
use assisted reproductive technology to conceive as the legal parents of the
66
child. Additionally, section 106 of the Act allows courts to use a means of
establishing paternity to instead create maternity. Thus, the paternity sec-
tion applies equally to women and can be relied upon by women. Finally, the
UPA promotes equality by rejecting the distinction between the legitimacy
and illegitimacy of a child; the Act treats children born outside of marriage in
the same way as children from traditional families.68 In these ways, the UPA
59. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between
Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125,
129 (2006).
60. Id.
61. Jenny Wald, Legitimate Parents: Construing California's Unform Parentage
Act to Protect Children Born Into Nontraditional Families, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAM.
CHILD & CTS. 139, 141 (2005), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov
/programs/cfec/pdffiles/1 0 Wald.pdf.
62. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(14) (amended 2002).
63. Id. §§ 102(14), 201.
64. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 370.
65. Meyer, supra note 59, at 129; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 204, 301-
02.
66. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701-707 (article 7); Laura Nicole Althouse,
Three's Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third Social Parent in
Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 171, 177 (2008).
67. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106; see also Althouse, supra note 66, at 177.
68. Meyer, supra note 59, at 129-30; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 202.
This 2002 amendment was made in order to rectify the complaint that children of
married parents were treated differently than those of an unmarried couple and be-
cause of the complaint that children of same-sex parents were completely ignored by
1384 [Vol. 75
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continues to adapt to the changing structure of the family in a quest to benefit
children and promote equality.
Missouri adopted a majority of the UPA in 1987,69 and the applicable
provisions span the Missouri Revised Statutes from sections 210.817 through
210.854.70 This has significantly changed the way parentage can be estab-
lished in Missouri. Sections 210.824, 210.826, and 210.848 are some of the
most significant and are discussed below.
1. Missouri Revised Statute Section 210.824
Although Missouri adopted a majority of the UPA, it resisted the 2002
revision regarding assisted reproductive technology and lesbian couples.71 As
a result, the only Missouri statute that deals with assisted reproductive tech-
nology is section 210.824, which allows the husband of a woman who is in-
seminated with semen from another man to be considered the natural father of
the child if the husband consents to the procedure in writing.72 Thus, Mis-
souri statutes do not expressly allow both women in a lesbian relationship to
be considered the parents of a child conceived through assisted reproductive
technology. As a result, under Missouri law, the legal parentage of two fe-
males must be established through nontraditional, judicially created forms of
standing asserting parental or custodial rights. As explained below, however,
Missouri has not yet adopted any of the alternative doctrines that protect the
rights of same-sex parents and their children.
the previous act. John J. Sampson, Preface to the Amendments to the Uniform Paren-
tage Act (2002), 37 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2 (2003).
69. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 10-11 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009), transfer de-
nied, No. SC90330, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6, 2009); S. 328, § 7 (Mo. 1987).
70. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 210.817-.854 (2000).
71. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701-707; see also Tim R. Schlesinger, As-
sisted Human Reproduction: Unsolved Issues in Parentage, Child Custody and Sup-
port, 61 J. Mo. B. 22, 23 (2005).
72. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824 states:
(1) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent
of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a
man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natu-
ral father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in
writing and signed by him and his wife. ... (2) The donor of semen pro-
vided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married
woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the
natural father of a child thereby conceived.
See also Schlesinger, supra note 71, at 23.
2010] 1385
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2. Missouri Revised Statute Section 210.826
Missouri Revised Statute section 210.826, which incorporates the UPA,
includes a variety of ways to determine if a father-child relationship exists.73
If a child has a presumed father, an action to determine whether a father ex-
ists can be brought by the child, the child's mother, the family support divi-
sion, a man alleging that he is the father, any person who has physical or legal
custody of the child for more than sixty days, or the presumed father.74 A
man is presumed to be the father if (1) he and the child's mother are or were
married and the child was born within three hundred days after the marriage
ended; (2) he and the child's mother attempted to marry each other, but the
marriage was invalid; (3) after the child was born, he and the mother married
or attempted to marry each other and he acknowledged his paternity; or (4) an
expert determines that he is the actual father through DNA tests. 75
If a child has no presumed father, an action to determine the existence of
a father can be brought by a variety of parties, including
the child, the mother or person who has legal custody of the child,
any person having physical or legal custody of a child for a period
of more than sixty days, the family support division, the personal
representative or a parent of the mother if the mother has died, a
man alleging himself to be the father, or the personal representative
or a parent of the alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a
76minor.
This statute allows for quicker determinations of parental rights. If it is
determined that the child has no father, the child can be adopted or placed
into a permanent home.77 This increases the opportunity for the child to find
a permanent home rather than wait in limbo while the court determines if a
father exists. If a father does exist, then it is required by law that he or the
court terminates his parental rights before the child can be adopted.78
Although the MoUPA contains sections devoted to the adjudication of
paternity, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District found in In re
Marriage of Fry that the UPA is not "the exclusive method for determining
paternity." 79 In Fry, the wife filed for divorce, and the husband claimed he
73. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.826 (Supp. 2009).
74. Id. § 210.826.1.
75. Mo. REV.STAT. § 210.822 (2000).
76. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.826.2 (Supp. 2009).
77. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.110 (Supp. 2009) (requiring the termination of paren-
tal rights before transfer of custody can occur).
78. Id.
79. 108 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003).
1386 [Vol. 75
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was not the father of the child born during their marriage.80 The parties
agreed on genetic testing to determine the child's father.8 ' The attorney
failed to set up the genetic testing and also failed to advise the husband when
the next hearing was to take place.82 The attorney withdrew, and the trial
court entered a judgment determining the husband to be the father, even
though the genetic testing never took place.83
On appeal, the husband argued that the trial court failed to determine pa-
ternity in accordance with the MoUPA and, thus, that the judgment should be
overturned.84 The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District agreed with
the husband and reversed the judgment, finding that paternity should be de-
termined in accordance with the MoUPA. However, the appellate court
determined that the MoUPA cannot be the "exclusive method for determining
paternity in Missouri."86 The court reached this conclusion because the legis-
lature previously added the MoUPA's definition section, section 210.817, to
the UPA provisions related to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Law (URESA) and the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)
determinations of paternity. In doing so, the legislature noted that "no other
provisions of [the UPA] shall apply in such actions." Even so, the court
stated that in the vast majority of cases, the MoUPA should "be applied as
uniformly and universally as is appropriate" because its goal is to provide an
overarching mechanism to determine parentage.89 Furthermore, the court
found that the MoUPA should be used when parentage is at issue and no oth-
er provision, other than the MoUPA, seems to apply. 90 As a result, Missouri
courts implement the MoUPA whenever possible.91
3. Missouri Revised Statute Section 210.848
The MoUPA allows a variety of parties to bring an action to determine
paternity; similarly, "[a]ny interested party may bring an action to determine
the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child relationship."92 Addi-
tionally, the provisions that apply to the father-child relationship also apply to
80. Id. at 134. The husband's claim arose after he learned of his wife's infideli-
ty. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 134-35.
83. Id. at 134.
84. Id. at 135.
85. Id. at 138.
86. Id. at 135.
87. Id. at 135-36.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 136.
90. Id.
91. E.g., id.
92. Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.848 (2000).
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the mother-child relationship.93  Since the UPA authors did not envision
many disputes arising concerning mother-child relationships, they did not
rewrite the paternity provisions to include maternity, as they were "already
complex." 94 Although this is understandable, it gives judges more discretion
in determining how the paternity statutes apply to maternity.95 This statute,
like Missouri Revised Statutes section 210.826, serves to hasten the place-
ment of a child into a permanent home, which requires the relinquishment of
both parent's rights. 96
C. Alternative Parentage Doctrines
In addition to the UPA, some courts have begun to permit nonbiological
parents to establish legal relationships with children under nontraditional
theories such as in loco parentis, de facto parentage, and equitable paren-
tage.97  These alternative forms of parentage have allowed nonbiological
same-sex parents, who would otherwise be without rights, to protect their
custody rights. Although Missouri courts have considered and applied some
of these theories in a few cases, they have not applied any of the theories to
same-sex couples asserting third-party rights to parentage. Each separate
theory and its application in Missouri are discussed below.
1. De Facto Parentage
Some states have extended parental rights to nontraditional parent-child
relationships through the doctrine of de facto parentage.9 8 A de facto rela-
tionship exists between a child and parent when the relationship is unable to
93. Id.
94. Missouri Revised Statutes section 210.848 is based on the Uniform Paren-
tage Act Section 21. The comment to section 21 states:
Since it is not believed that cases of this nature will arise frequently, Sec-
tions 4 to 20 are written principally in terms of the ascertainment of pa-
ternity. While it is obvious that certain provisions in these Sections would
not apply in an action to establish the mother and child relationship, the
Committee decided not to burden these - already complex - provisions
with references to the ascertainment of maternity. In any given case, a
judge facing a claim for the determination of the mother and child rela-
tionship should have little difficulty deciding which portions of Sections 4
to 20 should be applied.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 cmt. (amended 2002).
95. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 cmt.
96. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.110 (Supp. 2009) (either the court or the parents must
terminate the existing parental rights before a child can be adopted).
97. See infra Part III.C.1-3.
98. Elizabeth A. Delaney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Le-
gally Recognizing the Relationship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and
Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 177, 188-93 (1991).
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conform to traditional conceptions of parentage, yet the relationship exists
nevertheless.99 It is founded on psychological, rather than legal, theories.oo0
A person asserting a custodial right through de facto parentage acts as the
parent and considers himself or herself the child's parent in all ways except
that which falls within the legal definition of parentage.o' In order to claim
de facto status, the "biological stranger" must have (1) acted as a parent by
taking responsibility for the child's care, education, and development; (2)
lived with the child; (3) bonded with the child; and (4) completed the first
three elements of the de facto doctrine with the consent of the biological or
custodial parent.102
Additionally, defacto parentage often encompasses situations where the
substitution of a nonbiological parent in the place of a biological parent is in
the best interests of the child.'o3 While a biological parent, adoptive parent,
or any caregiver can be considered a de facto parent, an absent adult who
shows no interest in the child is never considered a defacto parent, regardless
of the adult's biological or legal relationship to the child.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re H.S.H.-K was one of the first to
apply defacto parentage to same-sex couples. 05 The case involved an appel-
lant's petition for custody of, or visitation rights to, the biological child of her
former partner. o0 In determining the appellant's rights, the court found that
the petition must meet the four elements of a de facto relationship. 0 7 The
court noted "the significance of a biological or adoptive parent's consent to
permit another adult to establish a parent-child relationship with a child."'o
While the court dismissed the appellant's petition for custody, it reversed the
order dismissing the petition for visitation rights and remanded the case to the
trial court to determine whether a de facto relationship existed.109 Missouri
has not yet adopted a defacto parenting standard." 0
99. Id. at 188.
100. Id. at 202.
101. Id. at 188.
102. In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995).
103. See Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998).
104. In re Phillip B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781, 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
105. H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419.
106. Id. at 420.
107. Id at 435-36.
108. Id. at 437.
109. Id
110. See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15 & n.8 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009), transfer
denied, No. SC90330, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6, 2009).
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2. In Loco Parentis
The doctrine of in loco parentis, meaning "in the place of a parent," is
another theory under which third parties can assert parental and custodial
rights."' It has been more widely accepted by states than de facto parentage
because stepparents have often used it to assert parentage.l 2 In loco parentis
is similar to defacto parentage in that a party asserts that although he or she is
not the adoptive or biological parent of a child, he or she is acting as the par-
ent and should be given the same legal rights." 3 However, defacto parentage
is based primarily upon the existence of a psychological relationship between
the nonbiological parent and child,' 14 whereas in loco parentis is based upon
whether the individual intentionally assumes parental status. 115
The doctrine falls within the policies of the Uniform Marriage and Di-
vorce Act (UMDA) in that it seeks to benefit children by promoting marriage
and a family unit, as well as by alleviating some of the harm created by sepa-
ration and divorce.1 16 In loco parentis promotes bonding between children
and nonbiological parents because it gives both parties the ability to create
permanent, lasting, and loving relationships without the fear that divorce or
separation will sever those ties.117 Furthermore, children are less likely to
suffer psychological or emotional distress in a divorce because under this
doctrine the in loco parent has the opportunity to continue a relationship with
the child." 8
Missouri courts determine whether a stepparent stands in loco parentis
by analyzing the manner in which the children are treated. The Missouri
Court of Appeals, Eastern District stated in In re Stevens' Estate that if the
stepparent
holds them out to the world as members of his family, he stands in
loco parentis and incurs the same liability with respect to them that
111. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 32 (N.Y 1991) (per curiam).
112. See Bryce Levine, Note, Divorce and the Modern Family: Providing In Loco
Parentis Stepparents Standing to Sue for Custody of Their Stepchildren in a Dissolu-
tion Proceeding, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315, 347-48 (1996).
113. Delaney, supra note 98, at 194.
114. Id. at 202.
115. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 32.
116. Levine, supra note 112, at 347-48 (citing UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 102 (amended 1988)).




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol75/iss4/8
ARE YOU MY MOTHER?
he is under to his own children, and the presumption in such case is
that they deal with each other as parent and child.l19
However, in loco parentis has not yet been applied to a case involving a
- -120
same-sex couple in Missouri.
It is also significant to note that a Missouri statute now supersedes earli-
er case law stating that a stepparent had no obligation to support a stepchild,
but could choose to do so. 121 Missouri Revised Statutes section 453.400 now
requires the stepparent to support the stepchild as long as they live in the
same house.122 However, fulfilling the statutory obligation to provide support
does not entitle the stepparent to custody of the stepchild, and the obligation
ends after the stepparent and child no longer live in the same house.123
3. Equitable Parenthood
The doctrine of equitable parenthood is a third option by which a third
party can assert parental and custodial rights. 124 Equitable parenthood de-
scribes individuals who desire custody and visitation rights to a child, even
though they do not satisfy the legal definition of "parent." 25 Under the
equitable parenthood doctrine, courts allow a parent to adopt a child even
though the adult failed to complete the adoption process, generally because
courts prevented the adult from adopting, like in cases involving same-sex
parents or neglect.126 In exchange for the rights to legal parenthood, these
individuals are willing to accept the responsibilities of supporting and caring
for the child.127
119. 116 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938), superseded by statute, Mo. REV.
STAT. § 453.400 (2000), as recognized in White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2009), transfer denied, No. SC90330, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6,
2009).
120. See White, 293 S.W.3d at 15-16 (doctrine applied to stepparent relation-
ships).
121. MO. REV. STAT. § 453.400.1; White, 293 S.W.3d at 15-16.
122. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.400.1 states:
A stepparent shall support his or her stepchild to the same extent that a
natural or adoptive parent is required to support his or her child so long as
the stepchild is living in the same home as the stepparent. However, noth-
ing in the section shall be construed as abrogating or in any way diminish-
ing the duty a parent otherwise would have to provide child support ....
123. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.400.1, .4.
124. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW:
DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 163-67 (3d ed. 2007). In this section, "equitable
parenthood," "equitable parent," and "equitable parentage" are used interchangeably.
125. Delaney, supra note 98, at 201-02.
126. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 124, at 636-37.
127. Delaney, supra note 98, at 201-02.
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Equitable parenthood is founded on the contractual legal theories of
equitable estoppel and equitable adoption.12 8 The doctrine of equitable es-
toppel states that a person may be prevented from asserting a right that he
otherwise would have possessed because others relied on his prior inconsis-
tent conduct, such as initially promising to help support and raise a child,
thereby encouraging the other parent to have the child in reliance on this sup-
port, but later relinquishing this assurance.129 This has been used in the fami-
ly court context to prevent fathers from denying paternity in order to evade
paying child support.' 30 Equitable adoption applies when an oral contract to
adopt a child is completely fulfilled. '3  Although this does not comply with
the adoption statute, which states that such a contract must be written, the
child is still deemed adopted for inheritance purposes.132
Equitable parenthood was first utilized in the Michigan case of Atkinson
v. Atkinson, where a husband, who was not the biological father of a child
born during his marriage, sought custody rights because he and the mother of
the child were divorcing.' 33 The mother established the non-paternity of the
father through blood testing and claimed that since he was not the biological
father of the child, he lacked all rights to custody.134 The court then consi-
dered whether the father was an equitable parent, meaning an individual who
helps provide the physical, emotional, and social needs of a child.135 The
court determined that in order for the father to gain equitable status, he was
required to meet three factors: (1) the father and son must recognize their
relationship with one another or the mother must have helped foster this rela-
tionship prior to the filing for divorce; (2) the father must desire parental
rights; and (3) the father must be willing to pay child support.136 After ana-
lyzing these elements, the court found that the husband qualified as an equit-
able parent.' 37 The court then remanded the case to the trial court to deter-
mine custody and visitation rights.138
Other states have used the doctrine of equitable parenthood to establish
parental rights in a similar way.139 Before utilizing the theory to allow a non-
parent the rights of a legal parent, other states applied the theory to find that a
partner was estopped from denying his obligation to support a child because





133. 408 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); see also Delaney, supra note
98, at 205.
134. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 517.
135. Id at 518.
136. Id at 519.
137. Id
138. Id.
139. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 124, at 163.
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the partner had made "prior claims of entitlement to custody and visita-
tion."1 40 Through the equitable parentage doctrine, the other party can seek a
declaration of the partner's maternity, custody, or obligation to provide sup-
port. Currently, more than half of the states acknowledge equitable paren-
tage. 14 1
In re T.L. was the first case where a Missouri court recognized the
equitable parent doctrine.142 The case involved a woman seeking custody of
her former lesbian partner's child after their break up.143 In the case, the
court stated, "Social fragmentation and the myriad configurations of the mod-
ern family present courts with new problems... . Courts must recognize that
custody and visitation disputes no longer occur only between heterosexual
couples."l44 The court adopted the doctrine of "equitable parent" and ana-
lyzed the elements listed in Atkinson. 145 From this analysis, the court deter-
mined that the homosexual partner qualified as an equitable parent.146
The court then determined that the biological parent's right to custody
must be balanced with the state's interest in the child's welfare and, as such,
the biological parent's right might be outweighed by another's interest in
custody.147 The court next applied the "actual detriment to the child" test,
since it found the "best interests" test did not fully serve the biological par-
ent's rights and the "parental unfitness" test did not adequately protect the
child.14 Additionally, the court stated that although the child might be dis-
criminated against for having two mothers, the court cannot deprive the part-
ner of rights "simply because she pursues a life-style at odds with the
norm."1 49 As a result, the court awarded the partner custody rights.150
Although In re T.L. appears groundbreaking because a Missouri court
accepted the equitable parentage doctrine, the decision was not binding
precedent for other custody and visitation cases because it was a circuit court
140. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 17 n. 11 (citing Chambers v. Chambers, No.
CN99-09493, 2005 WL 645220, at *7 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan.12, 2005); L.S.K. v. H.A.N.,
813 A.2d 872, 877-78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)), transfer denied, No. SC90330, 2009
Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6, 2009).
141. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 124, at 636.
142. In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521, at *2 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 7,
1996); Heather Buethe, Note, Second Parent Adoption and the Equitable Parent
Adoption: The Future of Custody and Visitation Rights for Same-Sex Partners in
Missouri, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 283, 303 (2006).
143. TL., 1996 WL 393521, at*1.
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *3.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *3-4.
150. Id. at *5.
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case and the parties agreed upon the terms of custody.'51 As a result, its im-
pact has been limited.
Additional Missouri courts have been reluctant to apply the equitable
parentage doctrine.152 For example, in Cotton v. Wise, a trial court granted
the placement of two minor children in the custody of their adult half sister,
rather than their biological father, after their mother's death.13 The father,
who formerly physically abused his daughters and their mother and owed
more than $11,000 in back child support, contested the custody arrange-
ment.154 The sister claimed custody under the equitable parent doctrine, and
the trial court granted custody to the sister under this theory.'55 However, the
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded the trial court's decision
because the supreme court declined to recognize the equitable parent doc-
trine, stating that "[t]he problem with a court-fashioned 'equitable parent'
doctrine is that the court has to improvise, as it goes along, substantive stan-
dards and procedural rules about . . . matters that already have well-charted
passageways under state statutes and related court decisions." 56 As a result,
the court determined that the state should have held a hearing before finding
that the natural father was without custody rights because a natural parent is
automatically presumed to be the appropriate custodian.'57 This notion can
only be overcome by evidence that the parent is unfit, unable, or unwilling to
care for the child.' 58 In accord with Cotton, the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Eastern District in Jefferson v. Jefferson also determined that the equitable
parent doctrine is not applicable in Missouri since the legislature has not
enacted analogous legislation. 59
151. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009), transfer denied,
No. SC90330, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6, 2009).
152. See Jefferson v. Jefferson, 137 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004); see
also White, 293 S.W.3d at 14 n.7.
153. 977 S.W.2d 263, 263-64 (Mo. 1998).
154. Id. at 263.
155. Id. at 264.
156. Id. at 265.
157. Id at 264-65.
158. Id at 264.
159. 137 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004).
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In White v. White, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District af-
firmed the dismissal of Leslea's petition for declaration of maternity, order of
custody, and order of child support.160 Judge Ellis wrote the majority opi-
nion, Judge Howard concurred in the decision, and Judge Ahuja concurred in
part and dissented in part in a separate opinion.I1i
A. Majority Opinion
First, the court examined the issue of standing under the MoUPA.162
Leslea argued that she and the children had standing under MoUPA section
210.826.2 to create a legally recognized mother-child relationship because
she is the legal and biological mother of Z.A.W., formerly held physical cus-
tody of C.E.W. for more than four years, and considers herself the mother of
C.E.W.163 The court rejected this argument, stating that each child already
has a mother because Michelle is the biological mother of C.E.W. and Leslea
is the biological mother of Z.A.W.M
The court went on to say that the identity of each child's natural and
presumed mother is already known.165 The court determined that because the
statute does not allow for more than one legal mother per child, neither Leslea
nor the children could bring a claim to establish a mother-child relationship
under MoUPA section 210.826.2.166 The court reasoned that swapping the
word "mother" in the place of "father" in MoUPA section 210.826.2 would
not make sense because if a child had no mother, the action to determine the
existence of the mother could not be brought by the mother. 67 As a result,
the court found that MoUPA section 210.826.2 could not apply in this situa-
tion.16 1
Second, Leslea argued that she had standing under MoUPA section
210.848, which allows "any interested party" to file an action to determine
160. 293 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009), transfer denied, No. SC90330, 2009
Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6, 2009).
161. Id. at 6, 25.
162. Id at 8.
163. Id. at 9; see Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.826.2 (2000); see also supra notes 73-76
and accompanying text. Additionally, she stated that the children had standing under
the statute because they have no presumed father. White, 293 S.W.3d at 9.
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whether a mother-child relationship exists.' 69 Leslea argued that she quali-
fied as an interested party since she acted as C.E.W.'s mother and wanted to
establish her legal right as such.170 Furthermore, she noted that interpreting
the statute as applicable only to biological parents works against its meaning
and prevents the intended effect of the statute.171 Additionally, Leslea argued
that other state courts, such as the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Rubano v.
DiCenzo, interpreted the analogous provision in the UPA as applicable to
nonbiological parents.' 72
The court also rejected this argument, finding that Missouri's statutory
scheme is different from that of Rhode Island, since Missouri adopted the
UPA almost completely while Rhode Island only adopted about a third of
it.173 Furthermore, the court found that Missouri's statutes are already deter-
minative on the issue, without looking to the UPA, because the MoUPA
states that an interested party does not need to have a biological relationship
to the child, but the action to declare parentage must be to declare a biological
relationship.174 Thus, the court found that "the MoUPA only allows claims
for declaration of a parent-child relationship based on a biological tie or a
presumption due to a marriage or attempted marriage." 75 The court noted
that because Leslea and the children could not petition for the declaration of a
biological relationship and because none of the parental assumptions applied,
Leslea, Z.W.A., and C.E.W. lacked standing under the MoUPA. 76
Leslea then asserted that she maintained standing under three equitable
parent doctrines that are recognized in Missouri: (1) a de facto parentage
claim, (2) standing in loco parentis to Michelle's biological daughter C.E.W.,
and (3) equitable estoppel.177 Michelle, in response, claimed the MoUPA was
the sole means of establishing parentage in Missouri, and thus none of the
other theories or doctrines could be considered.178 After examining the case
history in Missouri, the court determined that the MoUPA is not the only way
of establishing parentage in Missouri and that other ways could be consi-
dered, such as statutes or equitable proceedings drafted outside of the
MoUPA.179 However, the White court, relying on In re Marriage of Fry,
determined that the procedural requirements of the MoUPA should be applied
169. Id.; Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.848 (2000); see supra notes 92-96 and accompa-
nying text.
170. White, 293 S.W.3d at 9-10.
171. Id at 10.
172. Id (citing Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000)).
173. Id
174. Id at 10-11.




179. Id. at 12 (discussing In re Nocita, 914 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Mo. 1996) (en
banc); State ex rel. Illinois v. Schaumann, 918 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Mo. App. E.D.
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when parentage is in question and if, outside of the MoUPA, no other statute
or provision applies.'so The court in White then concluded that there were no
alternatives to the MoUPA in this situation and, thus, that the MoUPA should
be applied.18 1
Leslea's first argument in favor of standing was that the trial court erred
in "apply[ing] common law and equitable principles to safeguard the best
interests of children raised in diverse family structures."' 82 The Western Dis-
trict denied this argument outright because it did not comply with Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 84.04(d)(1), which requires legal reasons that support
the appellant's claim of reversible error, and was "nothing more than an ab-
stract statement of the law, which is unacceptable."' 83 Thus, the court found
that because this was a general policy argument that did not identify explicit
reasons to support a claim of reversible error, it failed without further re-
view.184
Leslea's next standing argument claimed that she is the de facto parent
of C.E.W. and Michelle is the defacto parent of Z.A.W."' To this end, she
1996); Washington ex rel. Lewis v. Collis, 963 S.W.2d 700, 702-03 (Mo. App. W.D.
1998); LeSage v. Dirt Cheap Cigarettes & Beer, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc)).
180. White, 293 S.W.3d at 12-13 (quoting In re Marriage of Fry, 108 S.W.3d 132,
136-37 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003); see also supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text.
181. White, 293 S.W.3d at 13.
182. Id.
183. Id. The court explained:
Rule 84.04(d) provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Where the appellate court reviews the decision of a trial court, each
point shall:
(A) identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges;
(B) state concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible
error; and
(C) explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those le-
gal reasons support the claim of reversible error.
The point shall be in substantially the following form: "The trial court
erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal
reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal
reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error]."
Thus, the rule requires that a proper point relied on must: (1) identify the
ruling or action of the trial court that is being challenged on appeal; (2)
state the legal reason or reasons for the claim of reversible error; and (3)
explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, the legal rea-
son or reasons support the claim of reversible error. Compliance with
Rule 84.04 briefing requirements is mandatory in order to ensure that ap-
pellate courts do not become advocates by speculating on facts and on ar-
guments that have not been made.
Id.
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argued that "'it is in the child's best interest to maintain his or her relationship
with a person who, in all respects but genetics, is the child's parent.'"18 In
support, she claimed that In re TL. recognized the concept of an "equitable
parent." 187 She also cited In re H.S.H.-K, which listed the four elements of a
de facto parenting relationship that Leslea claimed she and Michelle met. 88
However, the court rejected Leslea's arguments regarding both of the analog-
ous cases she listed.' 89 The court claimed the principles of In re TL. could
not be applied because the judgment did not hold precedential value.' 90 The
court rejected the argument from In re H.S.H.-K because it was a Wisconsin
judgment that no Missouri court had followed.' 9 ' Ultimately, the court found
that Leslea did not have standing as an equitable or a defacto parent. 92
Next, the court examined Leslea's argument that she stood in loco pa-
rentis to Michelle's child, C.E.W., and that Michelle stood in loco parentis to
Leslea's child, Z.A.W. 1 Relying upon In re Stevens' Estate, Leslea argued
that she and Michelle qualified under in loco parentis "because they jointly
raised the children with each other's consent, and treated each child, and held
each child out to the world, as the children of both of them."' 94 The court
also rejected this argument, finding that the holding of In re Stevens' Estate
had since been replaced by Missouri Revised Statutes section 453.400.1, stat-
ing that a stepparent's obligation to support the stepchild would terminate
once the stepchild stopped living with the stepparent.'9 5 The court went on to
find that even if it considered Leslea as in loco parentis to C.E.W. while they
lived together, that status ended after the couple separated.' 96
The court next considered Leslea's argument that Michelle should be
equitably estopped from ending the relationship between Leslea and C.E.W.
because she initially helped create and nourish that relationship.197 The court
found that this argument failed because equitable estoppel is a defense, rather
186. Id. (quoting PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1)(c)
(2003)).
187. Id.; see In re T.L., No. 953-2340, 1996 WL 393521 (Mo. Cir. Ct. May 7,
1996); see also notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
188. White, 293 S.W.3d at 14-15; see In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36
(Wis. 1994); see also notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
189. White, 293 S.W.3d at 14-15.
190. Id. at 14.
191. Id. at 14-15.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 15.
194. Id.; see In re Stevens' Estate, 116 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938), super-
seded by statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.400 (2000), as recognized in White v. White,
293 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009), transfer denied, No. SC90330, 2009
Mo. LEXIS 474 (Mo. Oct. 6, 2009).
195. White, 293 S.W.3d at 15-16; see supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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than a legal basis for establishing a parental relationship.198 Michelle never
refuted any of the information in Leslea's original petition.' 99 Rather, Mi-
chelle argued that even if all of it were true, there was no legal cause of ac-
tion.200 Thus, the court found that the issue consisted of "Leslea's inability to
articulate a recognized legal basis in the posture of this case for her action,"
rather than a claim under equitable estoppel.201
The court then considered Leslea's claim that the case qualified as an
exceptional circumstance that warranted third-party custody or visitation
rights even if the biological parent was fit.202 Although the court determined
that Leslea's situation did qualify as an exceptional circumstance, it found the
analysis must go further because "[n]either our statutes nor our case law re-
motely suggest that any third party that comes along has standing to bring an
action seeking custody of children." 203 Additionally, the court did not find,
nor had Leslea presented, any cases involving a third-party custody arrange-
ment in which the third party had not already intervened in earlier litigation
or where the third party had not been named as a party in the first custody
case.204
As a result, the court found that Missouri case law provided that a third
party's right to custody or visitation was first dependent upon (1) the third
party being involved as a named party in litigation involving someone else,
(2) the court allowing the party to intervene in a pending action, (3) and the
201third party already having an arrangement other than de facto custody.
Since Leslea did not fall within any of these categories, the court determined
206that she failed to qualify under the exceptional circumstances doctrine.
Therefore, the Western District found that none of Leslea's arguments regard-
207
ing standing prevailed.
The court then examined Leslea's argument that she was entitled to
child support because of the "express contractual assumption" (the term used
by the court) made by each woman to support the other's biological child-
ren.208 The court dismissed this theory because they found that Leslea's peti-
tion failed to state a claim for such relief, and thus it was not preserved for
appeal.209 Although the court entertained the idea that the women could have
entered into a contract to provide support to each other's biological child, the
198. Id.




203. Id. at 17-18.
204. Id. at 18.
205. Id. at 21.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 22; see supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
209. White, 293 S.W.3d at 22-23.
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court ultimately ruled that the breach of contract argument still would have
failed because the parties did not agree upon a length of time for the support
to continue.210 As a result, the court could not determine whether Michelle
failed to provide the support outlined in the agreement. Since Leslea was
unsuccessful in evidencing every element of the claim for breach of contract
and because the court determined that she never actually pleaded an express
contract theory as a basis for child support in her original petition, the court
denied her claim for breach of contract.211
The court then considered Leslea's final argument concerning violations
of due process and equal protection under the state and federal constitu-
212tions. Leslea claimed that she was denied procedural due process because
the court denied her petition without giving her a chance to demonstrate the
mother-child relationships that would receive protection under Missouri
law.213 The court rejected this claim because multiple hearings were held on
Michelle's motion to dismiss the petition in the trial court.214 Leslea also
asserted that her right to equal protection was violated due to her sexual
orientation, parental legitimacy, and/or sex.215 The court quickly denied this
claim, stating that no merit to her claim existed because, as stated above, she
lacked standing under the MoUPA and other parental doctrines.216 In addi-
tion, the court found the claim was "not based on legitimacy, sexual orienta-
tion, and/or sex."217
Lastly, Leslea claimed that the trial court violated Missouri's "open
courts guarantee," since she was unable to assert legal protection to preserve
her familial relationships. 2 18 The Missouri Constitution's open courts provi-
sion allows a person with a legitimate claim recognized by substantive law
access to the courts when a procedural bar stands in the way.219 The court
210. Id. at 23.
211. Id.
212. Id at 23-24.
213. Id. at 24.
214. Id




219. Id. (citing Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Merritt, 204 S.W.3d 278, 285
(Mo. App. E.D. 2006)) ("The 'open courts' provision of the Missouri constitution,
Article 1, Section 14, 'permits the pursuit in Missouri courts of causes of action rec-
ognized in substantive law' and 'applies only to judicial or legislative acts that impose
procedural bars to access to Missouri courts.' 'The open-courts provision was not
designed to create rights, but only to allow a person claiming those rights access to
the courts when such a person has a legitimate claim recognized by the law.' 'An
open courts violation is established upon a showing that: (1) a party has a recognized
cause of action; (2) that the cause of action is being restricted; and (3) the restriction
is arbitrary or unreasonable.' (citations omitted)); see Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14.
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found this argument, like Leslea's two federal constitutional arguments, lack-
ing merit because she had no recognizable cause of action, which is the first
element of an open courts violation. 220
The Western District affirmed the trial court's judgment and dismissed
Leslea's petition because it determined that (1) she lacked standing under the
MoUPA, the equitable parent doctrines, and equitable estoppel; (2) her claim
did not fall under the exceptional circumstances exception or a contractual
assumption made by the parties; and (3) she had no constitutionally valid
claims under due process, equal protection, or the open courts guarantee.221
B. Dissent
Though concurring with the majority in nearly all of Leslea's claims,
Judge Ahuja found Leslea's equitable estoppel argument meritorious, which
222
entitled her to seek child support for Z.A.W. Judge Ahuja stated that the
majority suggested that Leslea "should have invoked" promissory estoppel
223
rather than equitable estoppel. Regardless, he found that the majority was
wrong to make a distinction between the two doctrines because promissory
estoppel is a kind of equitable estoppel since 'equitable estoppel' is a broad
category 'which encompasses all estoppels arising out of some form of mis-
representation."' 224 Thus, Judge Ahuja determined that regardless of the
term, the estoppel claim was valid.225 Judge Ahuja determined that Leslea's
petition contained a valid estoppel claim because the couple had an agree-
ment, Leslea became impregnated in reliance on this agreement, the parties
considered Michelle Z.A.W.'s mother, Z.A.W. needed Michelle's support,
226
and Michelle upheld her part of the agreement until the parties separated.
Because he found her estoppel argument to have merit, Judge Ahuja de-
termined that "Leslea's petition [was] minimally sufficient" to support a
claim of equitable estoppel; thus, he stated that a fact finder should examine
227the evidence to determine if the necessary elements were supported. The
dissent contrasted this situation with one that involved a stepparent relation-
ship.228 Judge Ahuja argued that case law was hesitant to force a stepparent
to pay child support simply because the stepfather or stepmother acted as the
"natural parent," as this would discourage the voluntary support of stepchild-
220. White, 293 S.W.3d at 25.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 25 (Ahuja, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223. Id at 26-27.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 27.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 27-28.
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ren and nonmarital children.229 While in a stepparent relationship the child
has already been created, the dissent determined that Leslea became pregnant
in reliance on Michelle's promise to help support the child.230 Accordingly,
Judge Ahuja stated that Leslea's claim should be recognized because "a per-
son should not be permitted to make representations or promises on which
they know or should know others will rely to their detriment, only to later
attempt to escape those commitments scot-free." 23 1
V. COMMENT
A. Social Costs and the Need to Recognize Third-Party Parentage
Approximately ten million children are raised by same-sex parents in the
232United States. As the number continues to grow, more states have enacted
233
legislation to allow same-sex second-parent adoption2. However, many
states, like Missouri, continue to lag behind this "gayby boom" 234 and offer
no way for two same-sex parents to both assert parentage. While the parents'
relationship continues, this causes little concern. Yet, when gay couples
break up, their parental rights are left in limbo.
Without enjoying legal recognition as a parent, a same-sex parent who
formerly helped raise a child has virtually no way to claim visitation or cus-
tody rights. Additionally, a same-sex parent who is considered the legal par-
ent often cannot assert an entitlement to child support unless he or she can
establish that a contract was created between the parents.235 Thus, states pro-
hibiting adoption by same-sex parents prevent both the parents and the child
from assuming a typical relationship following a divorce. This disadvantages
and harms the children who were created or adopted during the relationship
and formed close bonds with both parents. Regardless of whether they have
two same-sex parents or heterosexual parents, children build strong bonds
229. Id. at 27.
230. Id. at 28.
23 1. Id.
232. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 342; Kellogg, supra note 3.
233. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 344-45 ("More than 20 states have formally recog-
nized second-parent adoption and others have allowed such adoptions in individual
cases, without ruling on the practice generally.").
234. Id. at 342; accord Ilene Chaykin, Babes in Arms, L.A. MAG., July, 2000, at
105; Kellogg, supra note 3.
235. Robin Miller, Child Support Obligations of Former Same Sex Partners, 5
A.L.R. 6th 303 (2005). Courts often use their discretion to determine whether a for-
mer same-sex partner has an obligation to pay child support. Id.; see, e.g., T.F. v.
B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1249-50 (Mass. 2004) (while court determined an implied
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with their caretakers. 236 The loss of this "physical and emotional security"
can cause a child to suffer from depression, anxiety, or attachment disord-
237
er.
Even alternative doctrines like de facto, in loco parentis, and equitable
parentage might not put same-sex parents on equal ground with biological
parents. For instance, Missouri accepts the status of in loco parentis, but only
in regard to a stepparent relationship, and a statute has mostly displaced the
use of the concept even in this way.238 Furthermore, in loco parentis is con-
sidered temporary, since it ends when the non-legal parent ceases to fulfill the
parental responsibilities. 239 If two same-sex parents break up and the nonbio-
logical parent wants visitation or custody of the child, like in White, then in
loco parentis offers no help in states like Missouri. As a result, the de facto
and equitable parentage theories offer the most protection for a nontraditional
parent, but these doctrines remain unrecognized by Missouri courts. 240 Fur-
thermore, they can also be misused or overlooked by courts.241
In this way, the alternative doctrines still qualify as "[p]yrrhic victories
for lesbian coparents . . . [because] lesbian coparents still occupy an inferior
legal status as compared to their former partners." 242 A "parent-like status"
establishes third-party visitation rights, but this still pales to the actual rights
given to the biological parent.243 The constitutional rights of nonbiological
236. Appellants' Brief, supra note 12, at *24 (citing JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT
(1969); DOUGLAS DAVIES, CHILD DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 13
(1999)).
237. Id. at *24 (citing Shelley A. Riggs, Implications of Attachment Theory for
Judicial Decisions Regarding Custody and Third-Party Visitation, 41 FAM. CT. REV.
39, 41-42 (2003)).
238. White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (citing Mo.
REV. STAT. § 453.400.1 (2000)), transfer denied, No. SC90330, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 474
(Mo. Oct. 6, 2009).
239. U.S. v. Floyd, 81 F.3d 1517, 1524 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Griego v. Hogan,
377 P.2d 953, 955-56 (N.M. 1963); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990)).
240. See supra Part III.C. 1, .3.
241. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 368 ("Because courts have not often recognized a
statutory basis upon which lesbian coparents can maintain their claims, they have
relied on the equitable principles discussed above both as a mechanism for determin-
ing whether the petitioner has standing to bring her claim and to decide the merits of
the claim. By conflating the issues of standing and merits, courts do little to clarify
the legal process for future petitioners. As noted conceming E.N.O. v. L.L.M., 'by
defining the de facto parent standard as an aspect of the substantive best interests
analysis, rather than as a procedural standing requirement, the E.N.O. court neither
explicitly extended nor limited the possible extension of parental standing rights to
lesbian coparents.' The court did not differentiate its standing analysis from its analy-
sis of the merits, leaving unclear the specific circumstances under which a lesbian
coparent may petition for custody and visitation with her child." (footnote omitted)).
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parents have yet to be clarified by the United States Supreme Court.244 As
previously stated, courts often look to the "genetic bond of parenthood" first
in order to determine custody rights and parentage.245
B. The Historical Emphasis on Biological Connections
Why would the courts still choose to determine parentage by biology? It
could be a backlash against the declining rate of successful marriages, the
decrease in the number of marriages, and the increase in same-sex parentage.
As a result, "[p]erhaps because the law no longer attempts to uphold the sanc-
tity of marriage, and there are no longer clear-cut presumptions to determine
custody, the biological fact of parenthood is looked on with ever greater fa-
vor."246
The importance of biology to the courts is backed by ample support.
For instance, in In re Baby M, a couple paid a surrogate $10,000 to be artifi-
cially inseminated with the man's sperm since his wife was unable to have a
child.247 The parties executed a surrogacy contract that stated the wife was to
adopt the child and the couple would be the legal parents of the child for all
248purposes. The surrogate later decided that she could not live without the
baby, and the couple commenced custody proceedings. 249 Ultimately, the
New Jersey Supreme Court "invalidat[ed] the surrogacy contract because it
conflict[ed] with the law and public policy of this State." 250 Furthermore, the
court stated, "There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot
buy."251 Although the court awarded custody to the biological father, the
court also restored the surrogate mother as the mother of the child and re-
manded the case to the trial court to determine the biological mother's custo-
dy rights.252
Other states have statutes that provide merely carrying a baby entails le-
gal rights to parentage, even if the surrogate mother has no biological relation
253to the child and never intended to parent the child. In 2009, for example, a
surrogate mother in Michigan contested the adoption of the children she car-
244. Schuster, supra note 56, at 569.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:3-46 (West 2010), as recognized in In re Adoption of Children by G.P.B., 736 A.2d
1277, 1285-86 (N.J. 1999).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1236-37.
250. Id. at 1234.
251. Id. at 1249.
252. Id. at 1234-35.
253. Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, With Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
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ried by the potential adoptive parents who had planned for the children's exis-
tence after finding that the potential adoptive mother suffered from schizoph-
renia, even though it was completely controlled for eight years prior to the
birth of the babies.254 The surrogate had no biological relationship to the
255
children since they were created though an egg and sperm donor. Howev-
er, the court ordered the two adoptive parents to return their twin babies to the
surrogate mother who carried them.256 In this way, courts have demonstrated
that physical ties trump parental bonds established through other ways, in-
cluding assisted reproductive technologies.
C. Solutions for the Modern Family and the Policy Implications of
Recognizing Alternative Parentage
The alternative doctrines still might not place a same-sex partner with
no biological tie to a child on an equal level with a biological parent in the
court's view. However, these alternative doctrines would be an improvement
over Missouri's current parentage scheme. Second-parent adoptions would
offer another way for same-sex couples to assert legal parentage. Through
this mechanism, two same-sex parents can be named the legal parents of a
child, which "protects the rights of the co-parents, by ensuring that the co-
parent will continue to have a legally recognized parental relationship to the
child if the couple separates or if the biological parent (or original adoptive
parent) dies or becomes incapacitated." 257
Only nine states and the District of Columbia have approved second-
parent adoptions in all counties statewide.258 Although some jurisdictions
allow second parent adoptions by broadly reading state adoption statutes,
other jurisdictions, like Missouri, prevent second-parent adoptions by inter-
preting the adoption statute narrowly to only allow for one parent of each sex
259to be named as a legal parent of a child. In order to end this outdated inter-
pretation and allow both same-sex partners legal parentage in Missouri, the
legislature should enact a statute that allows second-parent adoptions. Mis-
souri should also acknowledge the alternative legal parent doctrines with
regard to same-sex parentage. As previously discussed, such doctrines might
not be as powerful as second-parent adoptions. However, they allow the




257. Buethe, supra note 142, at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted).
258. The Human Rights Campaign, Second-Parent Adoption,
http://www.hrc.org/issues/parenting/adoptions/2385.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2010)
("Nine states and the District of Columbia have approved second-parent adoption for
lesbian and gay parents ... These states include: California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, [and] Vermont.").
259. Id.; Buethe, supra note 142, at 294.
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when they did not undergo a "second-parent" adoption. Couples often do not
consider the fact that they might break up when they have a child. After
same-sex couples break up and one parent asserts full custody rights, the oth-
er parent has no legal remedy or leverage. Alternative parentage doctrines
would allow them this opportunity.
Courts that have accepted these alternative doctrines have done so in or-
der to "serve the best interest[s] of the child" while still "protect[ing] parental
autonomy."260 Despite the backlash from some states, and attempts to pre-
serve marriage and the biological bond between parents and children,26 1 many
states are beginning to allow nonparents visitations with children if it is in the
"best interests of the child." 2 62 Similarly, Missouri has always sought to pro-
tect "the best interest[s] of the child," 2 63 which is why it should protect the
children of same-sex parents.
Although Missouri has not legalized gay marriage, it should be willing
to enact mechanisms to protect children with same-sex parents. By doing
this, the state does not necessarily support homosexual relationships. Rather,
the state entitles the children of same-sex parents to have two legal parents.
Research demonstrates that children with joint custody arrangements are
more satisfied with the separation arrangement and adjust better to the situa-
tion.264 Children benefit financially by having two legal parents through eli-
gibility under both parents' health insurance, benefits from life insurance, and
265inheriting assets from two legal parents. Additionally, children benefit
260. In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435 (Wis. 1995).
261. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Freel, 448 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1989) (refusing to
grant visitation to former girlfriend, despite recognizing that the relationship with the
child was "strong indeed" and that "the equities strongly favor [visitation]"); Alison
D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam) ("[l1n this state it is
the child's mother and father who, assuming fitness, have the right to the care and
custody of their child, even in situations where the nonparent has exercised some
control over the child with the parents' consent."); Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d
253, 255-56 (S.D. 1991) ("[I]n order to grant a nonparent visitation rights with a mi-
nor child over the wishes of a parent, a clear showing against the parent of gross mis-
conduct, unfitness or other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the
child is required.").
262. See, e.g., In re Hirenia C., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); In re
Robin N., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); In re Francisco A., 866 P.2d
1175, 1180 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
263. "The best interests of the child" is included in the MoUPA. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 210.838 (2000).
264. Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint Custody Versus Sole-Custody
Arrangements: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 97 (2002); Joan B.
Kelly, Longer-Term Adjustment in Children of Divorce: Converging Findings and
Implications for Practice, 2 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 119, 130-31 (1988).
265. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) (the court considered the
fact that children benefit financially from having two parents and allowed a second-
parent adoption because it was in the "best interests of the child").
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from having two legal parents to make emergency medical decisions.26 Fur-
thermore, having two legal parents offers security for the child and prevents a
battle over legal parenthood after a separation, as illustrated in White. By
disallowing same-sex parentage, Missouri discriminates not only against ho-
mosexuals, but also against the children of same-sex relationships.
Some argue that the in loco parentis and de facto parent doctrines are a
"slippery slope" that could "lead to situations in which someone like a child's
day-care provider asks for visitation."267 However, this is a far-fetched idea
that skews the true purpose of the doctrines. The alternative schemes adopted
by the UPA specifically analyze the type of relationship between the child
268
and parent. One author argues that "a genetic link is stronger than a non-
genetic link and that the genetic link goes beyond the love that a parent shows
a child." 2 69 While a genetic link may result in similar DNA and physical
characteristics, it seems absurd that children be tom from the parents that
helped raise and nurture them simply because they do not share the same
biology. Plus, all states now allow adoption.270 One of the primary reasons
behind this development was protecting the well being of the adoptive child,
rather than protecting "adoptive children as chattel of their natural par-
ents."27 1 This further indicates acceptance of the fact that nonbiologically
related parents and children have the same love and bond with one another as
biologically related parents and children. The Missouri legislature should
bear this in mind when considering stronger third-party parentage legislation.
Furthermore, "biology may mean less in a family in which the child is
the product of some form of alternative insemination and in which the genetic
connection may not correlate, even loosely, with the provision of day-to-day
care for the growing child."272 In White, Leslea never refused to consider
C.E.W. her child simply because they lacked a biological relation. Rather,
she based her parentage on the fact that she considered C.E.W. her own and
helped raise her as a part of a family. Some courts have determined that these
273
actions trump a biological relationship that lacks meaning beyond genetics.
266. See, e.g., id.
267. Rohlf, supra note 1, at 718.
268. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 102(14), 201 (amended 2002).
269. Rohlf, supra note 1, at 722.
270. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 124, at 619.
271. Carolyn J. Campbell, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Recent
Cases Affecting the Rights of Gays, Lesbians and Bisexuals, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 379,
407 (1993).
272. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 348 (quoting William B. Rubenstein, Development,
Divided We Propogate: An Introduction to Protecting Families: Standards for Child
Custody in Same-Sex Relationships, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 146 (1999)).
273. See, e.g., In re Ariel H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) ("[T]o be
declared a presumed father he must first show he has assumed parental responsibili-
ties for the minor. A parent, by definition, is someone who protects, guards, and
nurtures a child, physically and emotionally.").
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Missouri should do the same in order to continue to focus on the most impor-
tant factor - the best interests of the child.
VI. CONCLUSION
So, who qualifies as a parent? Instead of relying on history or the cur-
rent legal scheme, perhaps courts should look to a simple Dr. Seuss story,
Horton Hatches the Egg:
Remember Horton the elephant? One day he stumbles upon May-
zie, a bird who has no interest in hatching her egg. After coaxing
Horton to mount a tree and sit upon her nest, she vanishes. As
events unfold in Dr. Seuss's whimsical Horton Hatches the Egg,
Horton sits resolutely, unbudged by jeers, inclement weather or
nasty humans, who cart him off, tree and all, to be a sideshow in a
circus. When Mayzie happens by Horton's tent and sees that most
of the work is done, she demands her egg back. Just then, the egg
cracks open and out pops a tiny elephant with wings. Horton tri-
umphantly returns home to cheers with his bab-. It's perfectly
clear to all (save Mayzie) who the real parent is.27
In a similar fashion, Missouri should recognize the "real parents" in a
child's life by granting legal parentage to both same-sex parents. The in-
tended parent, who influenced another person to create a child, based on a
promise to partake in the child's upbringing and welfare, and then subse-
quently upheld this promise and helped raise the child, should be given the
same legal rights as the parent biologically related to the child. Missouri can
use various mechanisms to enforce these rights, including de facto parent-
hood, in loco parentis, and equitable parentage. Additionally, Missouri
should legalize second-parent adoptions throughout the state. Missouri's
current laws and the decision in White cripple the rights of same-sex parents
and do little more than victimize their children.
274. Id. at 75 (quoting Jill Smolowe, Baby Knows Best: Parenthood is Made of
More Than Genetic Material, TIME, Aug. 17, 1998, at 66).
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